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ABSTRACT
Restorative justice has been developing broadly in many countries as a new paradigm in the criminal law field.
Following the necessity and global trend, Indonesia has made an effort to replace the current Juvenile Court Act
(JCA) with the new one, called Juvenile Criminal Justice System Act (JCJSA), which utilizes diversion as a restorative
justice program for juvenile delinquent which took into effect since July 2014. As a new paradigm, restorative
justice has been criticized sporadically. One of the critics is how to balance public interest and individual interest
when they are in conflict regarding the restorative justice settlement that reached by the victim and offender. The
contention between the proponent and opponent of the restorative justice movement on this issue is remains
unsolved up to present. This issue is also possible may be arise when the Indonesian government enforces JCJSA.
As a Muslim-majority country, Indonesia has an opportunity to resolve the contention by offering Islamic Criminal
Law (jinayat) as an approach method since restorative justice values exist also in Islamic criminal law. There are at
least two notions why Islamic criminal law could relax the contention. Firstly, historically Islamic law ever existed
in Indonesia. Secondly, restorative justice values exist in Islamic Criminal Law. This paper will try to portray restorative
justice in Islamic criminal law point of view in order to mollify the contention.
Keywords: Restorative Justice, Islamic Criminal Law (Jinayat), Indonesia.
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pidana. Mengikuti kebutuhan dan tren global, Indonesia telah melakukan upaya untuk menggant iUndang-
Undang Pengadilan Anak dengan yang baru yang disebutSistemUndang-UndangPeradilanPidanaAnak yang
memanfaatkanpenalihansebagai program keadilanrestoratifkenakalanremaja yang mulaid berlakukan sejak Juli
2014.Sebagai sebuah paradigma baru, keadilan restoratif telah dikritik secara sporadis. Salah satu kritik adalah
bagaimana untuk menyeimbangkan kepentingan publik dan individu apa bila mereka berada dalam konflik tentang
ketika mereka berada dalam konflik mengenai penyelesaian keadilan restoratif yang dicapaiolehkorban dan pelaku
.Pertentanganantarapendukungdanlawandari gerakankeadilanrestoratiftentangmasalahini tetapbelum terpecahkan
sampai sekarang.Masalah ini juga mungkin muncu lketika pemerintah Indonesia memberlakukanUndang-
UndangPeradilanPidanaAnak.Sebagaisebuahnegaramuslim, Indonesia memiliki kesempatan untuk menyelesaikan
pertentangan dengan menawarkan Hukum Pidana Islam (jinayat) sebagai sebuah metode pendekatan karena
niai-nilai keadilan restoratif ada juga didalam Hukum Pidana Islam. Setidaknya ada dua pengertian mengapa
Hukum Islam terkesan tenang dalam pertengkaran.Pertama, secara historis Hukum Islam pernah ada di
Indonesia.Kedua, nilai-nilai keadilan restoratif ada di dalam Hukum Pidana Islam.
Kata kunci: HukumKeadilan, HukumPidana Islam, Indonesia.
I. INTRODUCTION
In much of the literature, proponents of restorative justice have unanimously affirmed that
the term “restorative justice” was first coined by Albert Eglash. Most of them also agree that it first
appeared in his 1977 paper,entitledBeyond Restitution—Creative Restitution which was presented at a
conference on restitution in 1975.
In his paper, Eglash described three faces of justice: (1) retributive justice; (2) distributive
justiceand; (3) restorative justice. The first aspect relied heavily on punishment as its prominent
technique for handling crimes, while the second advocated therapeutic treatment of
offenders(Routledge, 80: 1992). The third aspect, that is restorative justice, proposed restitution as
its characteristic feature in handling crime. Eglash referred to this as creative restitution. He noted
that, in many respects, retributive and distributive justice shared similarities but differed from
creative restitution. For instance, both punishment and therapeutic treatment were primarily con-
cerned withthe offender’s behavior, whereas restorative justice focused on the destructive or harm-
ful consequences of that behavior, and its effect on the victim of a criminal act.
Interestingly, as Eglash admitted, creative restitution was designed primarily for offenders,
noting that: “For me, restorative justice and restitution, like its two alternatives, punishment and
treatment, is concerned primarily with offenders. Any benefit to victims is a bonus, gravy, but not
the meat and potatoes of the process.”As we shall see later, various definitions have emerged with
the growth of the restorative justice movement that are wider than the above-mentioned definition
by Eglash, especially in term of its central concern.
Howard Zehr, the “grandfather” of restorative justice, originally conceptualized restorative
justice as a process that involved, to the greatest extent possible, those who had a stake in a specific
offence in collectively identifying harms, needs, and obligations, as well as their redress, to heal
and make things as right as possibleMark Umbreit and Marilyn Peterson Armour entitled,7:
2011)Another definition argued by Tony Marshal who wrote that “restorative justice is a process
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whereby all the parties with a stake in a particular offense come together to resolve collectively how
to deal with the aftermath of the offense and its implications for the future.” (Braithwaite, 11:
2002).
Marshal’s definition, however, raises the same question as Zehr’s definition, namely, who is
“the parties with a stake in a particular offense?” Additionally, according to Marshal’s definition,
what should be restored? The latter question was reasonably resolved within Zehr’s definition, that
is, harm and needs resulting from a specific offense.
To respond to the above question, we may refer to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
Resolution of 2002/12 regarding the Basic Principle on the Use of Restorative Justice Programmes
in Criminal Matters. In its annex, specifically subsection 4 of section I on the use of terms, it states
that “Parties” means the victim, the offender, and any other individuals or community members
affected by a crime who may be involved in a restorative process1<www.un.org/en/ecosoc/docs/
2002/resolution%202002-12.pdf> last accessed March 7, 2014.This is in line with John Braithwaite’s
response in his book regarding Marshal’s definition that a “stake in a particular offense” primarily
refers to the victim(s), offender(s), and affected communities (including the families of victims and
offenders). Braithwaite also answered the question of what should be restored as follows: “what-
ever dimensions of restoration matter to the victims, offenders and communities affected by the
crime. Stakeholder deliberation determines what restoration means in a specific context.”
(Braithwaite, 7: 2011)
In his audiovisual lecture, John Braithwaite explained restorative justice by describing its his-
tory and process in the following way:
Restorative Justice evolved from searching for a more productive way of dealing with crimes rather than
putting more and more people away in prison. The main idea is about restoring the victim, restoring the
offender and restoring the community. Because crime hurts, justice should heal. In a typical process the
victim will be asked to say who would they like to come to support them through the audience, then the
offender will be asked in the same way, and the supporter of the offender with the offender come
together with the victim and the victim supporter are facilitated, they sit together in a circle [sic]. First,
they talk about what happened, who was hurt by what happened and what might be done to right the
wrong and come up with plan of action and then there will be follow up to check whether the plan of
action is actually implemented to the satisfaction of all stakeholder  (Braithwaite, 7: 11).
It is clear from the three definitions provided by Zehr, Marshal, and Braithwaite that the
central focus has gradually changed from Eglash’s proposal of creative restitution which was de-
signed primarily for the offender. Borrowing Eglash words, now the victim has become “the meat
and potatoes” in most restorative justice programs.
For most criminal law scholars, incorporating victims—and the affected community when
appropriate—in the criminal justice process is a relatively new idea given that the role of victim in
this process has been represented and taken over by the investigator (police) and prosecutor. Re-
storative justice evidently has a different core concept from that of criminal justice.
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To clarify these differences, Zehr then differentiated between criminal justice and restorative
justice as shown in the table below: (Umbreit, 6: 2008).
TABLE 1: TWO DIFFERENT VIEWS OF JUSTICE
Historical Background of the Restorative Justice Movement
To many, the VORP (Victim Offender Reconciliation Program) was believed as the first “baby”
of the restorative justice program in its modern form. VORP was born from the “Kitchener experi-
ment” in 1974. At that time, two young individuals, aged 18 and 19 years, from Elmira in Ontario,
Canada, pleaded guilty to vandalizing 22 properties (houses and cars).
The case was published and widely discussed. Mark Yantzi, a probation officer, who was charged
with preparing the presentence report for this case, attended a Christian group meeting several
days before the guilty plea was filed. At the meeting, the Christian response to shoplifting was
discussed. Yantzi then conceived of the idea of the offenders meeting the victims to repair the
damage. In criminal procedural law, this idea was impossible to implement, because, as we men-
tioned earlier, the victims’ interests are taken over by the prosecutor.
Yantzi buried the idea because of the lack of a legal basis to support it. However, Dave Worth,
a coordinator of voluntary service workers for the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC), encour-
aged Yantzi to pursue the idea. He, therefore, took a chance and proposed to the judge that the
offenders meet with the victims and pay them back. Predictably, the judge refused to entertain the
idea.
Nevertheless, Yantzi’s proposal seemed to have influenced the judge, because when the time
for sentencing arrived, the judge ordered the offenders to have a face-to-face meeting with the
victims to work out suitable restitution as a condition of probation. Accompanied by their proba-
tion officer, the offenders then visited all of their victims, negotiated restitution, and within three
months had repaid their victims.
Theabove case was considered the inception of VORP in Canada, and is also believed to be
the first restorative justice program. Judges have subsequently continued to order this process to
be carried out. Van Ness notes that in 1976, the probation officer formed a nonprofit organization
to promote and facilitate these meetings(Van Ness, 1); (Umbreit,6); (Howard Zehr, 2005) Coinci-
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dentally, the initial practice of VORP in Canada fulfilled what Eglash had suggested in terms of
implementing creative restitution, namely the probation requirement.
Zehr describes VORP as “contagious,” with Indiana being the first state in the United States
to establish a similar program in 1977–1978 (Zehr, 159) More recently, restorative justice has been
discussed and implemented in several countries. Barda Nawawi Arief notes that within Europe,
Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, and Poland have been applying restorative justice in many
forms within their criminal code proceduresSee Barda (Nawawi Arief, 2008). From its first emer-
gence in Canada, the practice of restorative justice has been spreading to other continents such as
Europe, Africa, and Asia(Routledge, 35-40:  2008); (Van Ness , 33–38)The restorative justice move-
ment is unstoppable and has mutated into many forms to fit each country’s needs particularly for
handling juvenile offender.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Restorative Justice for Juvenile in Indonesia
In 2011, child population with the ranging age of 0-17 in Indonesia reached 82.6 million. This
means 33.9% or more than one third of Indonesian population is children (Profil Anak Indonesia
2012,5: 2012)The categorization age and the term of “child” or “children” here obviously refer to
Convention on the Right of the Child (UN Resolution 44/25 of 1989 on Convention on the
Rights of the Child) Children are a nation asset. The future of a nation relies on their shoulder.
However things may goes wrong within their life. One of which is when they in conflict with law.
Therefore special treatment and measurement should be made for handling child whom in con-
flict with law.
In regard to criminal law field, child is divided into two categories: child that is considered as
to young to bear criminal responsibility and child that perceived as able to bear criminal responsi-
bility. The earlier often called as child whilst the last varies to each country. For the purpose of this
paper, I employ “juvenile” referring to the second category and “child” for the first category (Juve-
nile Court Act Number 3/1997 and Juvenile Justice System Act Number 11/2012). Therefore
stipulating age of criminal responsibility is one of critical matters in criminal law field to distin-
guish child and juvenile. In respect to Indonesia, some changes have been made for categorizing
child and juvenile as we will describe below.
B. Criminal Responsibility Age for Juvenile in Indonesia
In its consideration part, United Nations (UN) Resolution Number 40/33 of 1985 on UN
Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (often called as The Beijing
Rules) recognizes that juveniles as young need special treatment by virtue of their early stage of
human development. This special treatment includes particular care and assistance with regards
to physical, mental and social development. Beside that legal protection in conditions of peace,
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freedom, dignity and security is also required.  Therefore formulating age of criminal responsibil-
ity for juvenile is one of measurements to create a safeguard in order to assure special treatment for
juvenile.
The Beijing Rules does not stipulate a fix age of criminal responsibility for juvenile. In its
annex, the Beijing Rules merely sets the beginning of age of criminal responsibility shall not be
fixed at too low an age levelThe phrase “too low” is actually difficult to be measured since each
country has their own law which reflected from their values and cultures. Even within same con-
tinent the minimum age of criminal responsibility varies from country to country. Take for in-
stance in European countries such Scotland, Ireland, France, Sweden, Spain, Luxemburg, within
these countries, criminal responsibility begins at 8, 10, 13, 15, 16 and 18 respectively (G. Van
Bueren: 26). This is because the formulation of law will depend on history or culture of a nation.
In Japan for instance, the range of criminal responsibility age is set at the age of 14 up to 19 (Penal
Code of Japan Act No 45/1907 art 41 and Juvenile Act of Japan No 168/1948 art. 2 (1) and 3 (1)).
whilst in New Zealand is set from 14 up to under 17 (Young Person and Their Family Act of New
Zealand  No 24 of 1989 section 2 subsection 1). This age limit formulation differs among coun-
tries depending on each economic, social, political and legal system (The Beijing Rules Annex of
Number 2.2)
In term of Indonesia, the provision for juvenile who commits crime in Indonesia prior to
Juvenile Criminal Justice System Act, hereinafter JCJSA, (Act Number 11/2012)and Juvenile Court
Act, hereinafter called JCA, (Act Number 3/1997) was stipulated in Indonesian Penal Code (Act
number 1/1946) article 45 (article 67 of JCA) of Chapter III about exclusion, mitigation and
enhancement of punishment.
Indonesian penal code sets maximum age of criminal responsibility at under 16 which means
for those who commit crime whose age is 16 or more would be regarded as adult. Indonesian
penal code does not set the minimum age of criminal responsibility for juvenile.
In 1997, an act for the juvenile court was established. With this act (Act No. 3/1997), the
general provision for juvenile, which was regulated under the KUHP, was abolished and replaced
by the act. In this act, juvenile between the ages of eight to under 18-year-old and unmarried fall
within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
For child whom below the age of eight and commits a delinquency, the investigator will exam-
ine whether the juvenile still can be educated by their parents or should be sent to social depart-
ment to be educated after hearing the consideration of the probation officer (Article 5 of JCA)
However the age of eight, later, was considered as too low for juvenile to hold criminal respon-
sibility. Subsequently Constitutional court in its decision number 1/PUU-VII/2010 has made a
judicial review, that filed by the parties above, by giving its verdict which stating the phrase “8 years
old” in article 1 verse 1, article 4 verse 1 and article 5 verse 1 of JCA including its explanation part
are in conflict with constitution of Republic of Indonesia and has no binding power therefore it is
conditionally unconstitutional unless interpreted as 12 years old. This minimum age then re-
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justified by JCJSA No 11 of 2012 which is going to replace JCA in 31 July 2014 (two years after its
enactment)
To ease, the long history in formulating age of criminal responsibility for juvenile in Indonesia
will be portrayed in table below:
TABLE 2: TABLE OF AGE OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR JUVENILE
C. The Necessity of Restorative Justice for Juvenile Delinquency in Indonesia
Currently, juvenile cases fall within jurisdiction of JCA. JCA does have several features of
measurement for juvenile offender to protect their mental development. For instance, the trial
should be held in camera, (Article 8 (1) of JCA) or law enforcement agencies are forbidden to wear
formal uniform when investigates, prosecutes and tries the juvenile offender and so forth (Article
6 of JCA)However the JCA has a main weakness i.e. it has no means for diverting the case in lieu
of criminal trial.
In relation with this, the Beijing Rules in point 6 of the general part of the resolution states
that “in view of the varying special needs of juveniles, as well as the variety of measures available,
an appropriate discretionary scope shall be allowed at all stages of proceedings and levels of juve-
nile justice administration, including investigation, prosecution, adjudication, and the follow up
of disposition.” (United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile
Justice (“The Beijing Rules”) Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 40/33, 29 November
1985).
According to the Beijing Rules, discretion is permitted in juvenile cases in order to divert out
of the criminal justice system at all stages and levels. Such diversion can be understood since
juveniles play a very important role as the next generation in light of a state’s sustainability. This
notion corresponds to the Declaration of The Right of The Child (UN General Assembly Resolu-
tion 1386), which states that children shall enjoy special protection, and shall be given opportuni-
ties and facilities, by law and by other means, to enable them to develop physically, mentally,
morally, spiritually, and socially in a healthy and normal manner and under conditions of freedom
and dignity. In the enactment of laws for this purpose, the best interest of the child shall be the
paramount consideration (Principle 2 of Declaration of the Right of the Child (General Assembly
Resolution 1386 (XIV) of 20 November 1959 in Paulus Hadisuprapto ,236: 2008).
Based on this idea, we should determine the best settlement for juveniles in conflict with the
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law in order to create a safeguard that protects the child and juvenile future. One such method is
what we know as restorative justice.
D.  JCJSA: New Chapter in Handling Juvenile Cases
The obsolete of JCA has triggered the birth of new act the so-called JCJSA which has been
passed by Indonesian Parliament and enacted on 30 July 2012 by Indonesian Government. JCJSA
has been formulated based on the basic idea that juvenile whom in conflict with the law should
have right to get special protection including to stay away from incarceration.
JCJSA categorizes child into three categories:  juvenile (as delinquent), victim child (as victim);
witness child (as witness). Unlike JCA which does not provide a diversionary system in lieu of
criminal court, JCJSA does provide.
JCJSA has 15 chapters consisting 108 articles. The provision regarding diversion, a restorative
program, is regulated in chapter two. The objectives of diversion are stated in article 6 which
declares:
To achieve reconciliation between victim and juvenile; (Juvenile here refers to child in conflict
with law (child as delinquent) according article 1 of JCJSA)
a. To settle juvenile case outside of the court process;
b. To divert juvenile from freedom deprivation;
c. Encouraging community to participate; and
d. To instill in a sense of responsibility to the juvenile.
The diversion is obligatory to be applied on criminal offenses that subject to be sentenced not
more than 7 years imprisonment and is not recidivism (Article 7 subsection 1 JCJSA) Outcomes
of the diversion consensus that provided by JCJSA may be: (Article 11 of JCJSA).
a. Reconciliation with or without redress;
b. Returned to parents/guardian;
c. Participation in education or training at an educational institution or at Institution of Social
Welfare Exertion (LPKS/Lembaga Penyelenggaraan Kesejahteraan Sosial) not longer than 3 (three)
months or;
d. Community service.
Musyawarah, a method for settling a dispute peacefully that involves all stakeholders,is going
to be used in JCJSA as a mechanism for implementing diversion as stated in article 8 Subsection
1:
“Diversion process is conducted through musyawarah involving juvenile and parents/its guardian, victim
and/or parents/its guardian, probation officer, and professional social worker based on restorative justice
approach” (Translated from art.8 (1) proses diversi dilakukan melalui musyawarah dengan melibatkan anak
dan orang tua/walinya, korban dan/atau orang tua/walinya, pembimbing kemasyarakatan, dan pekerja sosial
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professional berdasarkan pendekatan keadilan restorative)
What makes JCJSA unique is that there are three efforts and chances for juvenile getting
restorative settlement through diversion: at investigation stage, prosecution stage and adjudica-
tion stage (Art. 7 (1), 29, 42, and 52 of JCJSA)his is another words to say that conventional crimi-
nal trial is the ultimum remediumor the last resort for settling the case if diversion fails to be con-
ducted.
One thing should be noted that those efforts, diversion process, are obligatory to be exercised
by law enforcement agencies otherwise they are subject to be sentenced for not more than two
years imprisonment or fine maximum two hundred million rupias if they pass the diversion pro-
cess (Art. 96 JCJSA)The result of diversion agreement is guaranteed by the head of district court
determination. This is to ensure that the agreement acknowledged by the law.
The three stages of diversion processes as mention above in JCJSA are shown below:
FIGURE 1: JCJSA DIVERSION FLOW CHART(ARTICLE 7, 8, 9 AND 13 OF JCJSA)
From the diversion consensus above it can be seen that the last three consensuses address the
offender whilst the first one is formulated to meet victim interest. Therefore it reflects the same
idea with Eglash notion, that the victim here is not the meat and potato of the diversion process.
Therefore JCJSA is more offender-oriented rather than victim-oriented. This does not mean that
JCJSA ignores victim interest. In many articles it is clear stated that the victim plays a key role
whether diversion should occur or not since it needs a voluntarily consent of the victim party.
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In sum JCJSA is just like ‘a dream come true’, an act that predicted will protect child and
juvenile future. Based on Indonesian legal history, Indonesian people would likely not find diffi-
culty to exercise diversion as stated in JCJSA since they have been conducting musyawarah in their
daily life coping dispute. However, several things should be in consideration that up to now there
were no statistic numbers of how extent musyawarah have succeeded to resolve conflict in Indone-
sia.
E. Restorative Justice Values from an Islamic Criminal Law (Jinayat) Perspective
Islamic law is mostly portrayed as a cruel law, typically by pointing to the amputation of hands
as a punishment for theft, or to stoning for adultery. Moreover, after the 9/11 incident, Islam-
phobia has become widely apparent in many countries. However, the incident appears to have also
aroused curiosity to learn more about Islam itself. According to Nawal H. Ammar, Islam is cur-
rently an expanding religion in North America (Ammar, 162: 2001). Leaving aside this image and
the growth of Muslim populations around the world (http://newsfeed.time.com/2011/01/27/2-
2-billion-worlds-muslim-population-doubles/)the aim of this section is essentially to assess whether
restorative justice values exist within Islamic criminal law.
Islam came to Indonesia through Muslim traders who traveled to the Southeast Asian region
during an early period of Islam (the eighth century CE)(Uddin, 2010).Samudera Pasai is recognized
as the first Islamic Kingdom that was located in Northern Sumatera (Aceh) and founded during
the early thirteenth century CE. Since that time, Islam spread across the archipelago with the
emergence of other Islamic kingdoms. There is some evidence that Islamic law prevailed during
the era of Islamic kingdoms that continued to coexist in Netherland Indie (now Indonesia) (Dinar
Boontharm, 2003). Its power then declined with the advent of Dutch imperialism that included
the assumption of control over government and replacement of the law.
Indonesia is often categorized as a Muslim-majority country and simultaneously as containing
the world’s largest Muslim population (<www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-14921238> ac-
cessed January 30, 2014)A total of 87.2% of Indonesia’s population is Muslim (<http://
sp2010.bps.go.id/index.php/site/tabel?tid=321>; <www.indonesia-investments.com/id/budaya/
agama/item69> accessed January 30, 2014)Therefore, a discussion of restorative justice from the
perspective of Islamic law might offer a significant approach for implementing restorative justice
in Indonesia.
Islamic law currently prevails only in civil matters in Indonesia (Act Number 7/1989 on reli-
gious courts as amended by Act Number 3/2006) However, an exemption has been made for
Aceh province. In 1999, with an Act as its legal basis, Aceh gained special autonomy in certain
areas, one of which was to implement shariah (Islamic law), which includes Islamic criminal law
(Articles 1 and 3 of Act Number 44/1999 on Preferential Implementation of Aceh Preferential
Region Province) A decade has passed since 2004 when Islamic criminal law first prevailed in
Aceh regarding certain criminal offences such as adultery, gambling, khalwat (intimate relations
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outside of marriage), and selling and drinking alcohol (Fachri Bey,<www.ialsnet.org/meetings/
enriching/bey.pdf> accessed June 5, 2012)
The question that grounds this section is whether any restorative justice values exist within
Islamic criminal law? If there are such values, how can they contribute to the implementation of
the Juvenile Criminal Justice System Act (Act Number 11/2012)? Like adat criminal law, Islamic
criminal law (jinayat) is one branch of shariah law that was marginalized by colonial law. Shariah
means Islamic law that applies to all aspects of a Muslim’s life. Its branches include: ibadah (wor-
ship), jinayah (criminal law), muamalah (civil law), siyasah (politics), Al Mashrafiyah-Al Islamiyah (Is-
lamic banking), and Islamic humanitarian law. In this section, I focus only on jinayah to assess
whether it includes restorative justice values.
Criminal offenses (Al-jarimah,) in Islamic criminal law (jinayah) are divided into three catego-
ries. These are: Hudud, Qisas and Diyat, and Ta’ziras we will discuss below.
Hudud
Hudud denotes criminal offenses for which the had penalty is imposed. According to Abdul
Qadir Audah, had (the singular form of hudud) means a penalty that has already been determined
by syara (Al Quran and Al Hadist)and constitutes God’s right (haq Allah). From the above defini-
tions, Ahmad Wardi Muslich has characterized hudud as follows:(Muslich, 2005)
1. The penalty is specific and definite, implying that the penalty has already been prescribed and
has no minimum and maximum limitations.
2. The penalty constitutes God’s right (a public right), implying that there is no place for indi-
vidual rights, and if there is, then God’s right would take precedence for this offense.
As mentioned by Muslich, individual rights should be understood as the rights of the victim
of crime. In the framework of traditional criminal law, hudud can be understood to refer to crimi-
nal offenses that violate public rights, thereby leaving no place for the intervention of the individu-
als’ (victims’) rights in the criminal justice system process. According to Nawal H. Ammar, hudud
are the most serious crimes, because the offenders have violated God’s right by injuring harmony
within the community that is his creation and a public right. Most Islamic scholars agree that there
are seven criminal offenses that are categorized as hudud. These are: (1) Zina (adultery, including
fornication), (2) Qadzaf (slander), (3) Syurb Al-khamr (drinking alcohol), (4) Sirqah (theft), (5) Hirabah
( robbery), (6) Al-baghyu (rebellion), and (7) Riddah (apostasy)
Islamic criminal law (jinayah) is a system that employs not just retributive justice, but also
restorative justice(Qafisheh, 487).In my view, a perusal of the seven hudud crimes reveals the exist-
ence of values of restorative justice within theft and highway robbery. Both crimes provide dhaman
(redress) as their penalty. Moreover, redress applies to the victim and not to the state as in fines.
The victim’s interest in this type of crime is represented by the state, which simultaneously repre-
sents public interest.
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Theft
The legal basis for hudud relating to theft is prescribed in Quran surah Al Maidah: 38.Even
though the penalty of hand amputation for a theft is stipulated in the above verse, its implementa-
tion is more complicated than is commonly thought. As with other common forms of criminal
law, actus reus and mens rea are also required. Muslich described the following four criminal ele-
ments of theft: (Muslich, 83) (1) Taking (other’s) property furtively, (2) the object that is stolen is
property (Imam Bukhari, Hadist Number 6291)(3) the property belongs to another person, and
(4) the act is committed with an unlawful intention. The first three elements belong to the domain
of actus reus, whereas the last belongs to mens rea. In crimes of theft, there are three kinds of
evidence that are presented to prove whether the offender is guilty or innocent. These are evi-
dence provided through: (1) witnesses; (2) a confession; and (3) an oath (Muslich, 87–8).
The punishments for theft are redress (dhaman) and hand amputation. Both punishments
vary in the way they are executed, depending on each school. Hanafi’s school argues that redress
can only be imposed when hand amputation is not imposed and vice versa.According to Syafi’i
and Hambali’s school, both sentences can be simultaneously applied since hand amputation con-
stitutes God’s right, whereas redress constitutes the victim’s right.
Robbery (hirabah)
Capital punishment is applicable to highway robbery when it involves the killing of the victim.
The legal basis is the Qur’an surah Al Maidah: 33
“The punishment of those who wage war against Allah and His Messenger, and strive with might and
main for mischief through the land is: execution, or crucifixion, or the cutting of hands and feet from
opposite sides, or exile from the land: that is their disgrace in this world, and a heavy punishment is theirs
in the Hereafter.” (Yusuf Ali translation)
However, if the offender/s regret/s and repent/s (tawba) before they are apprehended, the
above-mentioned had punishment should be dropped. This is stated in the next verse of the same
chapter (surah):
“Except for those who return [repenting] before you apprehended them. And know that Allah is Forgiv-
ing and Merciful.” (Al Maidah:34)
However, even though the had punishment (in term of God’s right/public right) can be for-
given and, therefore, nullified based on the above verse, the victim’s right is not automatically
nullified. Therefore, in this case, the offender is still liable to provide redress for the victim. In case
the crime leads to the death of the victim, if the offender repents, the crime will be mitigated and
categorized as Qisas and diyat (Muslich (n 52) 104-05)
Qisas and Diyat
According to Ibrahim Unais, Qisas means handing down a punishment to the offender that is
similar to what s/he has done (to the victim) (Muslich (n 52) 149-05). Like hudud,Qisas and Diyat
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are criminal offenses that include punishments that are already determined by syara (shariah).
However, unlike hudud, the individual rights of victims are the predominant rights in Qisas and
diyat. Therefore, the victims within the QisasandDiyatoffense categoriesmay intervene in the crimi-
nal justice process. In fact, the victim is the paramount party in Qisas and Diyyat.
The criminal offenses in Qisas and diyat consist of just two criminal offences: homicide and
maltreatment. However, these are subdivided into several types: (Muslich (n 52) 104-05).
1. Murder (Alqatlul amdu).
2. Manslaughter that resembles murder (Alqatlu syibhul amdu).
3. Manslaughter by mistake (Alqatlul khoto).
4. Deliberate maltreatment (Aljinaayatu ala maaduunannafsi amda).
5. Non-deliberate maltreatment (Aljinaayatu ala maaduunannafsi khoto).
The legal basis for Qisas is prescribed in the following Al-Quran surahs:
a. Al-Baqarah:178
“O you who believe, Al Qisas (the law of equality in punishment) is prescribed for you in case of murder:
the free for the free, the slave for the slave, and the female for the female. But if the killer is forgiven by
the brother (or the relatives, etc.) of the killed against blood-money, then adhering to it with fairness and
payment of the blood-money to the heir should be made in fairness. This is an alleviation and a mercy
from your Lord. So after this whoever transgresses the limits (i.e. kills the killer after taking the blood
money), he shall have a painful torment.”
b. Al-Maidah: 45.
“And we ordained therein (Torah) for them: “life for life, eye for eye, nose for nose, ear for ear, tooth for
tooth, and wounds equal for equal.” But if anyone remits the retaliation by way of charity, it shall be for
him an expiation. And whosoever does not judge by that which Allah has revealed, such are the zalimun
(polytheists and wrong-doers—of a lesser degree).”
c. Al Baqarah:179
“And there is (a saving) of life for you in Al Qisas (the law of equality in punishment), O men of under-
standing, that you may become Al-Muttaqun [the pious believers of Islamic Monotheism who fear Allah
much (abstain from of all kind of sins and evil deeds which He has forbidden) and love Allah much
(perform all kinds of good deeds which He has ordained)].”
From the verses above, Qisasat first glance appears to share the same sense of retaliation as in
Lex Talionis.However, this is not actually the case, because Qisas provides diversion as a means to
mitigate the penalty to Diyyat (blood-money). If the victim or his or her relatives (in the case of
murder) forgives the offender, then the penalty will be mitigated as mentioned in the Qur’an.
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Punishments for Qisas and Diyat Offences
1. Murder
The Prophet Muhammad named murder as one of the four greatest sins in Islam:(Sahih Al-
Bukhari Volume 9, Book 83, Number 10)
Narrated by Anas bin Malik:
The Prophet said, “The biggest of Al-Kaba’ir (the great sins) are (1) to join others as partners in worship
with Allah, (2) to murder a human being, (3) to be undutiful to one’s parents, and (4) to make a false
statement, or to give a false witness.” (Emphasis added)
The punishment types applied to the murderer are:
1. Qisas.
For murder, the qisas is capital punishment.
2. Kaffarat
Freeinga slave or fasting for two months. This punishment is subject to debate. The Syafi’i
school argues that this is mandatory for the offender as one of the main forms of punish-
ment. However, according to the Hanafiyah, Malikiyah, and Hanabilah schools, this is not
a mandatory punishment in the case of murder.
Diyat. The above qisas can be mitigated through conversion into diyyat if the victim
forgives the offender. In this case, the offender should pay diyyah amounting to 100 cam-
els or 1000 dinar (www.islamicmint.com/dinar_dirham/> last visited on March 10, 2014.)
3. Ta’zir. This is an alternative punishment and its implementation is subject to the policies
of each state. According to the Malikiyah School, if the qisas is diverted due to forgiveness,
then the offender is obliged to comply with Ta’zir. The ta’zir punishment prescribed by
the Malikiyah School for murder is 100 lashes and exile for one year. Nevertheless, many
Islamic scholars do not consider ta’zir to be mandatory for murder. The judge decides
whether to impose ta’zir.
2. Manslaughter that resembles murder (Alqatlu syibhul amdu)
Manslaughter that resembles murder refers to a crime in which the offender intentionally
commits an unlawful act, but does not intend to kill the victim. However, the crime culminates in
the death of the victim.
The punishment for this criminal offence is:
1. Diyat of 100 camels
2. Kaffarat (freeing a slave or fasting for two months).
3. Ta’zir
If the victim forgives the offender and the offender sincerely pays the diyyat, then the state
(represented by the judge) may mitigate the punishment through its conversion into Ta’zir
(depending on the school and policy)
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4. Cancellation of the offender’s inheritance right.
According to AlHadith, a person who commits homicide may not receive an inheritance.
3. Manslaughter by mistake (Alqatlul khoto)
The punishment for this criminal offence is:
1. Diyyat of 100 camels
2. Kaffarat
3. Cancellation of the offender’s inheritance right
4. Deliberate and nondeliberate maltreatment
Classification of the above criminal offenses is determined by whether or not the crime is
intentionally committed and by considering its severity. In general, the main punishments for
these crimes are qisas. However, these can be mitigated through their conversion into diyyat and
ta’zir punishments if the victim forgives the offender.
In conclusion, qisas may be dropped if the victim grants forgiveness or if sulh (reconciliation)
occurs.
Ta’zir
Ta’zir is the third category of criminal offenses and their punishment in Islamic criminal law.
Etymologically, the root of the word ta’zir is azzar, which has four synonyms, one of which is
addaba meaning to educate. According to Al Mawardi, cited by Muslich, terminologically ta’zir
means a punishment that has an intrinsically educational characteristic not been prescribed by
syara (Muslich (n 52) 248–9) Therefore, Ta’zir crimes include all crimes that are not classified as
hudud,qisas and diyat. However, several of the latter crime categories can also be categorized as ta’zir
crimes if there is doubt concerning the evidence, or if the requirements concerning elements of
the crime are not fulfilled. These include, for instance, cases where the value of the stolen object is
less than a quarter dinar.
Ammar propounds that all forms of restorative justice programs such as mediation, confer-
ences, and victim’s compensation may be implemented with little resistance in the ta’zir category
(Ammar, (n 40) 173).I suggest that ta’zir is both a category of crime and punishment in Islamic
criminal law that has the ability to adapt with a society’s development. Therefore, I argue that it is
possible to implement restorative justice within the framework of Islamic criminal law. Moreover,
forgiveness in Islam is encouraged and highly rewarded by God. To illustrate this, I cite several
Hadiths related to forgiveness, anger control, and generosity below: (M Yasar Kandemir, 2009).
“God shows his mercy to those who are merciful, have compassion to creatures on earth so that those
in heaven may have mercy upon you” (narrated by Tirmidzi Kitab Al-Birr Hadith No. 48).
“Every kindness will be rewarded tenfold”(narrated by Bukhori, Kitab Al-Sawm, Hadith No. 56).
“I guarantee that anyone who does not fight even when provoked, shall be given a mansion in paradise”
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(narrated by Tirmidzi, Kitab Al-Birr Hadith No. 58).
A strong person is not the one who beats his rivals in wrestling, but a strong person is the one who
controls his anger (narrated by Bukhari, Kitab Al-Adab Hadith No. 76).
A generous person is close to God, close to human being[s], close to Paradise, and far from Hell (nar-
rated by Tirmidzi, Kitab AlBirr, Hadith. No. 40).
Age of Criminal Responsibility for Minors in Islamic Law
Al Quran and Al Hadith do not specify the age of criminal liability for minorsAli Imron,
‘Kontribusi Hukum Islam Terhadap Pembangunan Hukum Nasional (Studi Tentang Konsepsi Taklif dan
Mas’uliyyat dalam Legislasi Hukum)’ (The Contribution of Islamic Law to National Law Develop-
ment, 2008).The Quran merely states a general condition, baligh (Al Quran SurahAnNur: 59)There-
fore, ulama (Islamic scholars) have conducted ijtiha to determine the baligh criteria, as delineated
by Ali Imron in Table 2 below (Imron (n 70).
Stipulating the age of criminal responsibility for juveniles is a critical matter in Islamic crimi-
nal law, because a person to whom the baligh criteria do not apply should not incur the punish-
ment of a hudud crime. Therefore, if a juvenile commits a hudud crime, the punishment should be
mitigated to ta’zir.
In conclusion, redress or compensation, remorse, repentance, forgiveness, and reconciliation
are values of restorative justice that exist within adat criminal law, community policing, and Is-
lamic criminal law. I suggest that these would provide a valuable base for implementing formal,
state-recognized programs of restorative justice. Restorative justice is not an alien concept for most
Indonesians, and would probably be accepted without any significant resistance. Moreover, the
values that I have described are broad-based values regardless of religion or ethnicity.
Bridging and Balancing Public and Private Interests within Restorative Justice
The Beijing Rules suggest that efforts shall be made to establish a set of laws, rules, and
provisions that are designed to:
a.  Meet the varying needs of juvenile offenders, while protecting their basic rights;
b.  Meet the needs of society; and
c.  Implement the rules thoroughly and fairly.
In many respects, the above criteria, particularly clauses a and b, are not easy to implement.
Moreover, the victim can be considered as an additional variable. In civil matters, this problem
would probably not occur since the conflict only involves each party and society or the public have
no part in it. However, in criminal matters, society also has its needs in the words of the Beijing
Rules, or its legal interest, to cite Gerry Johnstone. Restorative justice takes back the victim’s rights
from the state and returns them to the victim. It seems that restorative justice is leading to the
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collapse of the wall between civil and criminal matters. This does not, however, mean that society’s
interest can be totally abandoned as Johnstone points out, citing Zehr:(Routledge, 69: 2011).
Since one cannot ignore the public dimension of crime, the justice process in many cases
cannot be fully private. The community, too, wants reassurance that what happened was wrong,
that something is being done about it, and that steps are being taken to discourage recurrence
According to Zehr, many proponents of restorative justice insist that the public dimensions of
crime should not be considered more important than the private dimensions. Johnstone notes
that finding a way of balancing these interests, in theory and in practice, is an important challenge
facing those who campaign for restorative justice(Routledge, 69: 2011).
A conflict of interest between the victim and society may occur in many cases. Johnstone
provides an example of a person who commits indecent assault against a relative and then offers
TABLE 3: BALIGH CRITERIA
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generous restitution, a genuine apology, and agrees to undergo therapy that leads to the satisfac-
tion of the victim, who then refuses to testify in a criminal trial. A question then arises: if the
prosecutor thinks that the conviction and punishment of the perpetrator is in the public’s inter-
est, would it be right to compel the victim to testify in the trial?(Routledge, 69: 2011).Such a case
mentioned by Johnstone, would be a touchstone for restorative justice.
Theoretically, I suggest that the answer to the above question hinges on the approach of Is-
lamic criminal law, particularly qisas and ta’zir. In terms of qisas, society should understand that it
is the victim rather than society who has the predominant right. Therefore, the victim’s decision
should be respected.
Interestingly, in Islamic criminal law, society’s aspirations can also be considered in the con-
text of ta’zir. Its flexibility in adapting to society’s development makes balancing and bridging the
interests of victims and society possible. In the Islamic criminal law concept, relationships between
humans (habluminannas) should be resolved among themselves when they are engaged in a con-
flict. This can be applied to the relationship between the victim and offender, which can encom-
pass both families. The offender may sincerely repent to God who is most merciful, but the issue
remains of crimes that belong to victims whose privilege and right it is to forgive. On the other
hand, humans also have a relationship with God (habluminallah) (Ibn Majjah Hadith No. 419) In
term of the law, and with some points of note, this can be regarded as a public or state right.
Repentance can be shown by serving a punishment issued by the state. In short, the type of
relationship determines to whom the perpetrator should be liable. According to Islamic criminal
law, all human deeds should be accountable, whether in this world or in the hereafter. In terms of
punishment, these two worlds are connected. Therefore, a perpetrator who is punished in this
world will be spared in the hereafter.
As we described in chapter three, ta’zir means a punishment that has an intrinsically educa-
tional character not prescribed by syara. This means that the government decides on the type of
punishment. Therefore, in cases where a crime is viewed as infringing both God’s right and an
individual’s right, the fulfillment of both interests is possible through the application of restor-
ative justice as well as a stipulated punishment (for instance, incarceration). However, in the con-
text of Islamic criminal law, the stipulated punishment should not conflict with the Qur’an and
Hadist.
To return to Johnstone’s example, indecent assault in Islamic criminal law is categorized as a
ta’zir crime that is related to dignity and morals (kehormatan dan kerusakan akhlak) (Muslich (N 52)
256) In accordance with the nature of ta’zir, the punishment of this crime is left to the state.
Therefore, if on one hand this case is perceived as a breach of an individual’s right, and on the
other hand, is also deemed an infringement of God’s right (public right), then the offender could
be punished by the state as well as be obliged to restore the victim. This does not mean that the
offender receives double jeopardy (ne bis in idem) since these components, entailing separate re-
sponsibilities to the state (public) and to the victim, can be “packaged” as one punishment. More-
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over, as we discussed in chapter two, recently, the approach of integrating the victim’s rights, for
example, through a victim impact statement, restitution, and state compensation within a crimi-
nal trial has been proved to be possible.
In short, the contention between public and individual interests may be alleviated by adopting
the Islamic criminal law approach, particularly the concepts of qisas and ta’zir, depending on the
case.
JCJSA provides clear-cut provisions. The use of diversion is obligatory in all criminal offenses
requiring that the offender be sentenced to not more than seven years of imprisonment, providing
that they do not involve recidivism, as we noted in chapter four (Article 79 (2) of JCJSA)This
implies that diversion can be employed for a wide range of crimes. As Johnstone has shown,
indecent assault is generally one such crime that can be diverted. Chapter XIV of the Penal Code
of Indonesia stipulates that indecent assault entails crimes against decency. The imprisonment
period described within this Chapter is below seven years for all crimes committed by a juvenile in
this context. An exception, however, is if the indecent assault or an obscene act results in the
victim’s death (Article 291 (2) of the Indonesian Penal Code: If one of the crimes described in
Articles 285, 286, 287, 289, and 290 (obscene acts)).
III. CONCLUSION
Clearly, introducing something new into a well-established system is not as simple as flipping
a coin and resistance may occur. It is in this context that the contention between the victim’s
interest and public interest is likely to emerge. Prior to JCJSA, all the victim’s interests were taken
over by the police and prosecutor, which reflected public interest. In the near future, the victim’s
interest will be returned to the victim and public interest will be correspondingly reduced. I delib-
erately use the term “reduced,” because the community still has a place in diversion. According to
JCJSA chapter VIII, Article 92 (c) regarding community participation, a community may partici-
pate in a diversion. However, the victim’s interest is paramount in JCJSA, particularly in the
diversion process.
However, responses of outrage that can happen within society may be viewed from a different
angle. The lesson is that society is watching and has the power to show disagreement. Again, as we
proposed earlier, the solution lies in the Islamic criminal law approach. As a Muslim-majority
country, Indonesia still has a place for Islamic values within society. Apology, forgiveness, remorse,
repentance, and compensation are some general Islamic values that, like common sense, can be
easily accepted as broad-based values, regardless of religion.
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